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The issues raised by David Hensher are illustrated in many recent developments and current 
problems faced in Britian. As is well known, the deregulation of bus services from 1986, and 
subsequent privatisation of rail services from 1996, has created in situation in which very 
extensive experience has been obtained both of commercial operation, and services contracted to 
public authorities – recent developments in the bus and coach sector are reviewed in White 
(2005) and issues relate to competition and tendering in both bus and rail sectors in White (2006, 
forthcoming). 
 
The issue of asset ownership being retained (or transferred to) in the public sector does not 
generally arise with respect to rolling stock, unlike some cases he discusses. Apart from a few 
cases where authorities have provided buses to operators, the general practice is that the operator 
owns (or leases) the rolling stock, the cost of this (depreciation & interest, or leasing charges) 
being reflected in total costs covered either from passenger revenue (in the case of commercial 
services), or within the contract price. For example, a very modern bus fleet is now operated in 
London (98% of buses below ten years by the end of 2005, average age around 4 years) as a 
result of specifications in contracts for Transport for London (TfL), but it is the operators’ 
responsibility to provide the vehicles. Clearly, higher costs are incurred, which will be reflected 
in the contract price (TfL 2005, p 290). The national rail fleet is largely provided through leasing 
from rolling stock companies, although the market set up for this purpose at the time from 
privatisation was somewhat artificial (especially in charges made for older stock) and only 
recently has a more competitive market developed. 
 
A more critical issue is the ownership of infrastructure. The privatisation of the national rail 
system involved the transfer of infrastructure (track, signalling, stations etc.)  to a  private 
company (Railtrack plc). Following its demise, a semi-public body, Network Rail, now controls, 
such assets (its debt has been classified as ‘public’ by the Office of National Statistics, given 
government guarantees that exist). However, this remains as a monopoly supplier.  
 
 In the case of privatisation of the bus subsidiaries of London Transport, depots as well as 
vehicles were sold off. This may have given incumbents a  substantial advantage, given the 
difficulty that newcomers face in acquiring land and planning permission for new operating 
bases. A more competitive market might have been secured by retaining depots in public 
ownership, making their use open to newcomers as well as incumbents. Currently, in the London 
area 86 depots are owned by operators, and 8 by TfL (TFL 2005, p 40), but  TfL is now seeking 
to build 15 new depots which will assist newcomers to enter the market (Transit 2006, p 7) 
 
David Hensher rightly raises the issue of quality of service in contracts, given the shift in 
emphasis from the simple cost-minimisation approach in the first phase of competition and 
privatisation. In the case of rail services, a fairly strict quality regime has been in place from the 
outset, with monitoring of train performance through data derived from the control system, and 
attribution of delays between service operators and the infrastructure provider. Incentive and 
penalty payments are linked to this. Monitoring of performance in the case of local bus service 
(especially commercially-registered routes) has been more difficult, but in the London network a  
shift to ‘Quality Incentive Contracts’ (QICs)  recently has produced substantial improvements in 
performance, linked with a set of incentive and penalty payments additional to the basic contract 
(London Assembly 2006). For example, rather than setting the minimum running time operators 
may now set a  more realistic schedule to reflect variability in running  times. This may involve 
more resources being used, but produces a higher quality of service for the users. 
 
However, the Public Private Partnership (PPP) for the London Underground highlights some of 
the difficulties David Hensher mentions. Its very long duration (30 years, with periodic review 
every 7.5 years) makes it difficult to remove a contractor whose performance is unsatisfactory. It 
is also questionable whether penalty payments are sufficiently large to incentivise the 
infrastructure companies to minimise delays to passengers (for example, where weekend 
engineering work over-runs). A particular dissatisfaction has been expressed about performance 
of Metronet, a company holding two of the three contracts (Transit 2006). 
 
The issue of trust’ between operators and authorities is illustrated in the case of commercial local 
bus services. Quality can be improved both through action by operators (for example, better staff 
training) and by local authorities (for example, greater provision of bus priorities). This can be 
seen in the ‘quality partnership’ (QP) concept. However, trust between partners can be poor. For 
example, transferring  road space from private cars to buses is politically difficult, yet the local 
authority receives no guarantees of service frequency or fares from the operator when such 
changes are introduced. The ‘quality contract’ (QC) concept, introduced in law under the 
Transport Act 2000 (but yet to be applied in practice) would create a situation similar to that in 
London, in which authorities would be able to specify service and fares levels, but is opposed by 
the operating industry. Its ‘ownership’ of profitable commercial services would be affected by 
such changes (since the incumbent operator would be in the same position as  other bidders), 
leading to questions of possible compensation. A less strict application of competition laws 
would assist in enabling competing operators to co-ordinate their services, and could form part of 
a  ‘third way’ between QPs and QCs, now being considered. 
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